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ABSTRACT
The surge in political information, discourse, and interaction has
been one of the most important developments in social media over
the past several years. There is rich structure in the interaction
among different viewpoints on the ideological spectrum. However,
we still have only a limited analytical vocabulary for expressing
the ways in which these viewpoints interact.
In this paper, we develop network-based methods that operate
on the ways in which users share content; we construct invocation
graphs on Web domains showing the extent to which pages from
one domain are invoked by users to reply to posts containing pages
from other domains. When we locate the domains on a political
spectrum induced from the data, we obtain an embedded graph
showing how these interaction links span different distances on
the spectrum. The structure of this embedded network, and its
evolution over time, helps us derive macro-level insights about
how political interaction unfolded through 2016, leading up to the
US Presidential election. In particular, we find that the domains
invoked in replies spanned increasing distances on the spectrum
over the months approaching the election, and that there was clear
asymmetry between the left-to-right and right-to-left patterns of
linkage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Political interaction has long constituted a key use of social media,
and there is a correspondingly rich history of research into its
structure — one that extends the much longer history of scholarship
on the role of media in the political process [6, 14, 23, 25].
A crucial issue in this line of work is the extent to which political
interaction on social media takes place primarily among users who
are ideologically similar, or whether it reaches across the political
spectrum. Early analysis of political blogging indicated a clustered
structure, with a high density of linkage among ideologically similar
blogs and a lower density of linkage between blogs with strongly
differing views [1]. Subsequent work, looking at platforms that
arose further into the evolution of social media, suggested that a
more complex structure was developing, in which homophily in
views remained a powerful force, but where the platforms were
providing users with some level of cross-cutting exposure [3, 4].
This paper is published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
(CC BY 4.0) license. Authors reserve their rights to disseminate the work on their
personal and corporate Web sites with the appropriate attribution.
WWW 2018, April 23–27, 2018, Lyon, France
© 2018 IW3C2 (International World Wide Web Conference Committee), published
under Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 License.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5639-8/18/04.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3178876.3186129
These questions are important, as they ask whether online political
interaction consists of opposing sides who engage with each other,
or well-separated clusters who are isolated in “echo chambers” or
“filter bubbles” [11, 27, 30].
The answers to such questions depend intrinsically on which
types of interactions are being considered. Existing work in the
online domain has implicitly focused on two standard forms of in-
teraction: page-to-page interaction, expressed by hyperlinks among
documents [1]; and user-to-user interaction, expressed by commu-
nication among people on social platforms [3, 4, 9]. Each of these
induces a network on a set of entities — sources and users respec-
tively — which can then be analyzed relative to an underlying
political spectrum.
Networks of sources invoked by users. Here we consider a
different type of political interaction network, defined as follows.
When a user u shares a page A, and a user v replies by sharing a
page B, there is not simply an interaction between users u and v;
an interaction is also induced between pages A and B. As reshares
develop into a widespread style of social media content production
[8, 10, 17, 24], the ability of users to deploy page references as
proxies in their discussion becomes an activity requiring very low
effort, and we find through a large-scale analysis of Twitter data
leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election that such A-B
interactions are widespread: users regularly invoke links in this
back-and-forth fashion when they interact with each other.
These invoked interactions between pagesA and B are fundamen-
tally different from both user-to-user and page-to-page interaction
networks. Unlike free-form user-to-user interactions, they create
logical relationships among the information sources, not just the
consumers and sharers of these sources. But they are not like tradi-
tional page-to-page interactions either, because they are not based
on a hyperlink from A to B, and they are not in general determined
by the authors of either A or B; it is the readers deciding how A and
B should be used in discussion who are determining the logical link
between them. In this sense, invoked interactions between A and B
are not directly under the control of the authors of A and B; they
form a kind of “revealed interpretation” of A and B once they are
released into social media.
The idea that replying to page A with page B can create a se-
mantically meaningful connection between A and B formed the
basis of an elegant technique due to Frigerri, Adamic, Eckles, and
Cheng [12] for identifying pages to debunk widely circulated ru-
mors. Drawing on the fact that snopes.com is a heavily-used site
for evaluating Internet rumors, they demonstrated that many in-
stances of a pair (B,A), where A is a page appearing in Facebook
posts and B is a page on snopes.com, serves as strong evidence
that B is providing a judgment on the credibility of A. In this way,
scanning the replies to posts where A occurs for pages residing on
snopes.com provides an automated method for identifying a page
B that can help users evaluate the veracity of A.
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Figure 1: A section from an example invocation graph containing instances from our data. In each case, an article from domain
B in response to an article from domain A contributes to the link from B to A. The link from Breitbart to The New York Times
comes from articles like the pair shown here, a Breitbart article on the Times’ taxes in response to a Times article on Donald
Trump’s taxes. Other links demonstrate an interaction where one article supports another: for example, a New York Times
article shared in response to a Guardian article on Russian information operations contributes to the link from The Times to
The Guardian.
Given that invoked interactions between pages A and B more
generally are voluminous, transcending any one particular domain
or use case, what do we learn if we consider the set of all such
interactions as a network in its own right, latent in a social media
platform?
The presentwork: The structure of invocation graphs. We
are interested in understanding the global structure of the network
of invoked interactions, and developing methods that can probe this
structure, particularly for questions related to political interaction.
Because our primary focus in this work will be at the granularity
of news and blogging sources rather than the individual pages they
produce, we will consider this network at the level of domains:
using a large Twitter dataset covering all of 2016 up to the U.S. Pres-
idential election, we say that an invoked interaction from domain B
to domain A occurs whenever a user replies to a tweet containing
a page from domain A with a page from domain B.
We define the invocation graph on a set of domains of interest as
follows: for all pairs of domains A and B where there is at least one
invoked interaction from B to A, we include a weighted directed
edge (B,A) whose weight is equal to the number of such invoked
interactions. Because we want to study how portions of the invo-
cation graph reflect aspects of political interaction, we choose the
node set (i.e. the domains of interest) using a preprocessing step
that only includes domains that were extensively retweeted with
the official Twitter accounts of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump,
and then apply some further filtering heuristics that we describe in
the next section.
After this filtering, we have an invocation graph that reflects
the ways in which Twitter users interacted with one another by
invoking content from different politically relevant domains over
the course of 2016. Figure 1 shows a few domains of such an invo-
cation graph with some sample interactions from our data. We can
see these interactions can be supportive, like an in-depth New York
Times report on Russian information operations shared in reply to
an article from The Guardian on the same subject, or adversarial,
like a Breitbart article on the New York Times’ taxes shared in
response to a Times article on Donald Trump’s taxes. These replies
exhibit rich structure and give a sense for how complex political
interactions unfold on social media
We can thus return to some of the initial motivating questions
and ask how this interaction was structured relative to a political
spectrum containing support for Clinton on the left and support for
Trump on the right. We do this using a political spectrum induced
from the data, rather than relying on external domain knowledge.
There are a number of ways to do this [5, 11, 14] that yield broadly
consistent results, and we employ a method of Benkler et al (de-
scribed further in the next section) that bases the spectrum on the
relative frequency of co-tweets with the Clinton and Trump Twitter
accounts [5].
Embedding the Invocation Graph in a Political Spectrum.
Having thus located the domains on a political spectrum, we now
have an embedded version of the invocation graph: the nodes, repre-
senting domains, are embedded in a one-dimensional spectrum, and
the weighted directed edges span pairs of points in this spectrum.
We can now ask how the edges are distributed across distances on
the spectrum, ranging from short-range interactions that connect
domains of similar political orientation to long-range interactions
that reach across sides. In examining these questions, it is crucial to
recall that these links among domains are not defined by hyperlinks
in the content on these domains, but instead via the replies made
by users when they invoke this content in discussions: it is not
that the domains are replying to each other, but that they are being
invoked in replies by users. The data thus reflects choices made by
the consumers of the content, rather than by authors of the content.
In Section 3, we propose a set of methods to analyze how the
edges of the invocation graph span the underlying spectrum. A
core component of these methods is, for a domain x , to consider
its out-link distribution — the distribution of “landing points” on
the political spectrum for all links out of x . As we move from left
to right along the spectrum, tracking the out-link distributions
of domains we encounter along the way, do the means of these
distributions tend to move from left to right as well, or do they
tend to move inversely from right to left? The former case would
indicate a positive correlation in the locations of the source and
target of an invoked interaction (B,A), suggesting links are used
Mapping the Invocation Structure of Online Political Interaction WWW 2018, April 23–27, 2018, Lyon, France
to connect to similar sides of the political spectrum; the latter case
would correspond to a negative correlation and hence connections
across the spectrum, with domains on the left being invoked to
reply to domains on the right, and vice versa.
It is not a priori obvious which type of correlation we should
expect to see; and as a reinforcement of this fact, we find that the
nature of the correlation actually inverts over the course of 2016
leading up to the U.S. Presidential election. In the early parts of
2016 we have a positive correlation, with politically similar domains
being invoked to reply to each other; but by the time we reach
the months directly preceding the election, this same correlation
measure has become negative, indicating that most of the linking
is now crossing the spectrum. We verify this effect using multiple
measures, including one in which we compare the trends across
the spectrum to what we’d observe in a randomly rewired version
of the embedded graph.
We also propose a set of methods to identify inherent asymme-
tries in the patterns of linkage: do replies from left to right have the
same structure as replies from right to left? Using our measures, we
find strong asymmetries in the 2016 Twitter data, with domains on
the right side of the spectrum having a disproportionately high rate
of out-links in the invocation graph and domains on the left side
of the spectrum having a disproportionately high rate of in-links.
This right-to-left flow in the replies persists across the entire time
range, and is a key characteristic of the structure.
Since a recurring theme in our analyses is the way in which
replies increasingly engaged opposite sides of the political spectrum
as 2016 went on, it is interesting to ask whether we see a similar
effect in a more traditional user-to-user interaction graph, with
nodes corresponding to users and directed edges to replies from one
user to another. To explore this, we adapt the techniques developed
for the invocation graph to a user-to-user graph built from Reddit.
Specifically, we analyze a snapshot of Reddit’s politics subreddit,
r/politics, for the same period of 2016 up to the election; we
classify users by whether they had posted to the Clinton or Trump
subreddits, and then look at the rate of replies among different
types of users. We find that the trend on Reddit closely tracks the
trend in the invocation graph built from Twitter, with increasing
linkage between the two sides as the election approached.
Overall, our methodology suggests that the invocation graph
on domains, and its embedding into a one-dimensional spectrum,
captures important aspects of political interaction on social media
— the tendency of users to interact by invoking links to authored
content, and the use of these interaction patterns to thus reveal
relationships among the content based on usage in everyday dis-
cussion.
2 BASIC DEFINITIONS
We begin with a Twitter dataset containing aggregate-level infor-
mation about tweet-reply pairs. For each month from January to
November 2016 (the US Presidential election was held on Novem-
ber 8, 2016), the dataset consists of pairs of domains x1 and x2
along with an accompanying count, the number of times a tweet
containing a page from domain x1 was posted in reply to a tweet
containing a page from domain x2. In addition, for each month, we
have an auxiliary dataset of co-occurrences: for each domain x , the
number of times a user posted a tweet containing a page from x on
the same day that the user retweeted Hillary Clinton’s or Donald
Trump’s personal Twitter account. Finally, we have the number of
retweets of Clinton or Trump for each month.
The invocation graph we construct from this data is a directed
graph with domains as vertices, where each domain corresponds
to a news source. We draw an edge x1 → x2 if a tweet containing
a URL from domain x1 is posted in reply to a tweet containing a
URL from domain x2. The weight of this edge is the number of such
tweet-reply pairs. On first inspection, the most prominent feature
of this graph is that self-loops (consisting of links from a domain x
to itself) have much higher weight than other edges. Since our goal
is to examine political interactions between domains, we remove
all self-loops from the graph.
Isolating Political Domains. The first issue we encounter is
that Twitter contains a wide range of URLs, not just pages from
politically relevant domains. We could select only known political
domains by whitelisting them, i.e. only considering the subgraph
over a predefined set of domains; however, this approach will in-
evitably miss out on influential but less well-known news sources.
On the other hand, there are challenges to a completely unsu-
pervised approach. URLs on Twitter are dominated by social media
sites (e.g. twitter.com, facebook.com) as well as content-hosting
sites (e.g. imgur.com, bitly.com) which produce virtually no content
of their own, but instead host user-uploaded content such as im-
ages, links, and text. While the usage of these content-hosting sites
would be interesting to study, this is outside the scope of our work.
We begin by blacklisting several known social media and content-
hosting domains and remove them from the graph. However, there
are plenty of domains that appear on Twitter that are not politically
relevant, and we cannot individually remove each such domain.
To filter out such domains, we need some measure of political
engagement for each domain. We can construct such a measure
by using the observation that politically relevant domains should
frequently co-occur with known political entities – in our case, the
official Twitter accounts of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.
Our measure of political engagement for a domain, then, is sim-
ply the number of times a user posted a tweet with that domain on
the same day that he or she retweeted either Clinton’s or Trump’s
official Twitter account. Intuitively, the more politically engaging
a domain is, the more it will co-occur with these political enti-
ties. With this proxy, we can select domains with high political
engagement, excluding social-media and content-hosting domains.
As a final filter, we require that each domain have an edge of at
weight leastW to some other domain in the political subgraph. This
restricts our attention to the most actively used political domains.
Based on this, we can formally define the invocation graph. Every
domain in the invocation graph
• is not blacklisted (social media and content-hosting domains)
• has political engagement above some threshold p
• has at least one edge to another domain in the invocation
graph with weight at leastW
We require the invocation graph be connected and contain some
seed domain. Any choice of popular American news outlet would
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yield exactly the same result, as they all belong to the same con-
nected component. (We use nytimes.com, but the choice is immate-
rial.)
Based on this definition, the algorithm to construct the invoca-
tion graph is as follows: begin with the full graph, remove all nodes
that are either blacklisted or have political engagement below p,
and run a breadth-first search beginning at nytimes.com following
only edges of weight at leastW . In practice, we find that the values
we use for p andW don’t affect our results much, and all of the
results presented here use p = 10000 andW = 100. Because we
study the change in this invocation graph over time, we build a
new graph Gm for each monthm from January to November 2016.
A Political Spectrum. In order to characterize the political
nature of this graph, we need some way of organizing the domains
along a political spectrum. Drawing on techniques from [5] and our
definition of political engagement, we define the quantities PT (x |C)
and PT (x |T ) for each domain x as the empirical probabilities that
a user posted a tweet containing a URL from domain x given that,
on the same day, he/she retweeted Clinton’s or Trump’s official
account respectively. Intuitively, if a user has retweeted Clinton on
a given day, the domains that he/she invokes are more likely to be
on Clinton’s end of the political spectrum, and the same is true for
Trump. Figure 2 shows the resulting values, where the blue line
is PT (x |C) = PT (x |T ). Interestingly, most domains lie above this
line, suggesting a difference in the populations of users retweeting
Clinton and Trump respectively.
Figure 2: PT (x |C) vs. PT (x |T ) for September 2016
Furthermore, we can condense this information into a single
political score for each domain:
sT (x) = PT (x |T )
PT (x |C) + PT (x |T ) (1)
Note that sT (x) ∈ [0, 1], and the larger sT (x) is, the closer x is to
the Trump end of the spectrum. Throughout this section, we use
the spectrum built on January-September 2016.
3 METHODOLOGY
With these definitions, we can analyze various properties of the
invocation graph, and in particular, its interaction with the political
spectrum. Do usage patterns of news articles and other political
content differ across the political spectrum? How do these patterns
change leading up to the election? Using the invocation graph in
tandem with the political spectrum, we can shed light on these
questions.
Out-link Distributions. A key characteristic we study is the
out-link distribution for a domain x : the distribution of positions
on the political spectrum where edges originating from x land. A
domain’s out-links describe the way in which it is used to reply
to other domains. For example, if a domain has many out-links to
other domains near it on the political spectrum, one might expect
that it is being used to reinforce a particular point of view; however,
if it has many out-links to the opposite end of the spectrum, it may
instead be used to disagree or argue with an opposing viewpoint.
To draw upon this intuition, we ask how x ’s out-link distribution
varies based on its political score sT (x). As a baseline for compari-
son, we compute the global out-link distribution — the distribution
over the political spectrum of where edges inG land. Comparing to
this baseline will give us some insight as to how x ’s linking pattern
differs from the “average” linking pattern.
However, since G contains no self-loops, x doesn’t link to itself,
while the global out-link distribution contains links to x . To prevent
this from biasing the comparison, we instead compare x ’s out-link
distribution to the out-link distribution of G\x , that is, G with x
and all edges into or out of x removed.
Thus, x ’s out-link distribution distribution d(x ,G) is a distribu-
tion over [0, 1] assigning probability mass to y ∈ [0, 1] proportional
to the weight of edges from x to x ′ such that sT (x ′) = y. The global
out-link distribution D(G\x) can then be expressed as
D(G\x) =
∑
x ′∈G\x d(x ′,G\x) · vol(x ′,G\x)∑
x ′∈G\x vol(x ′,G\x)
,
where vol(x ′,G\x) is the total weight of edges leaving x ′ in G\x .
In other words, D(G\x) is the weighted average of d(x ′,G\x) for
x ′ ∈ G\x .
We make the comparison between these distributions formal as
follows: for each x , let µout(x) be the weighted average political
score of the domains that x links to, so that µout(x) = E [d(x ,G)].
This gives an estimate of what types of domains x is used to reply
to — if µout(x) is close to 0, then x is used primarily to reply to
Clinton-related domains, while if it is close to 1, then x is used
primarily to reply to Trump-related domains. In a slight abuse of
notation, let µout(G\x) be the weighted average political score of
all endpoints of edges in G\x , so µout(G\x) = E [D(G\x)]. Then,
δout(x) = µout(x) − µout(G\x) (2)
is a measure of how much x deviates from other domains towards
the Trump end of the political spectrum.
From past work documenting homophily in online political ac-
tivity [1], one might expect that a domain will be used primarily
to engage with politically similar domains, implying that sT (x) is
positively correlated with δout(x). Furthermore, it is not a priori
obvious whether this trend should become more or less pronounced
leading up to the election — do the opposing parties increasingly
converse within themselves, or do they engage with one another?
Mapping the Invocation Structure of Online Political Interaction WWW 2018, April 23–27, 2018, Lyon, France
(a) January 2016 (b) October 2016
Figure 3: Correlation between sT (x) and δout(x) for January and October
Figure 3 shows that in January, domains are more likely to have
links in the graph to politically similar domains, so sT (x) and δout(x)
are positively correlated. However, by October, this correlation has
reversed: on average, domains are being used to reply across the
political spectrum instead of to politically similar domains. Replies
seem to be adversarial, as with the breitbart.com→ nytimes.com
edge in Figure 1.
To understand this change in correlation over time, we define
a(Gm ) to be the slope of the correlation between sT (x) and δout(x)
for month m. Figure 4 shows that a(Gm ) decreases significantly
from January to October 2016. This suggests that as the election
drew nearer, the fraction of interaction between opposite ends of
the spectrum increased, and domains from the two opposing sides
were actually being invoked more often to reply to each other.
Figure 4: a(G) for January-November
Edge Lengths and Crossing Points. Another way of charac-
terizing the political aspects of the invocation graph is to consider
the lengths and locations of the edges on the political spectrum. As
the interaction between opposing viewpoints increases, we expect
to see longer edges in the invocation graph that cross the political
spectrum instead of staying on one side. Figure 5 shows that this
trend holds true between January and October — while most links
had length close to 0 in with respect to the political spectrum in
January, by October, many longer edges were present.
Figure 5: Edge length distributions for January vs. October
To enable us to visualize where on the spectrum edges lie, we
make the following definitions. For a point y ∈ [0, 1], let f→(y,G)
be the number of edges (x1,x2) such that sT (x1) < y < sT (x2).
Similarly, let f←(y,G) be the number of edges such that sT (x1) >
y > sT (x2). In otherwords, f→(y,G) is the number of edges crossing
y from left to right on the political spectrum, and f←(y,G) is the
number of edges crossing y from right to left.
In order to interpret these functions, we need a baseline to com-
pare against. A natural baseline in such scenarios is the randomly
rewired graph Gˆ, the idea of which goes back to [26]. In Gˆ, ev-
ery vertex has the same indegree and outdegree as in G, but each
edge has a randomly chosen endpoint. Note that this can create
self-loops, which G does not have by construction; however, the
number of self-loops in Gˆ is small (often 0 for a given randomiza-
tion) and therefore their effect on this analysis is negligible. Figure 6
shows f→ and f← for G and Gˆ, where the values shown for Gˆ are
in expectation. In January, both f→ and f← are dominated by their
rewired counterparts, while in October, the opposite is true. This
suggests that at the beginning of the year, domains were used to
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(a) January 2016 (b) October 2016
Figure 6: f→(y) and f←(y) for G and Gˆ
reply to politically similar domains, resulting in shorter edges than
a random baseline, while closer to the election, domains were used
to reply across the political spectrum. This comparison allows us to
get a sense for how actual behavior deviates from random behavior,
and how this deviation changes over time.
Asymmetry in Out-links. Another striking feature of Figure 6
is that f← dominates f→, showing that many more links crossed
right-to-left than left-to-right. Intuitively, it seems that a dispro-
portionate number of edges originate on the right and end on the
left, corresponding to right-leaning domains being used to reply
to left-leaning domains. We can make this precise by defining r (x)
as the ratio of indegree(x)/(indegree(x) + outdegree(x)) and ana-
lyzing how r (x) changes with sT (x). Figure 7 shows that r (x) is
negatively correlated with sT (x), meaning that domains on the right
end of the political spectrum produce a disproportionate number
of out-links compared to domains on the left end. In other words,
domains on the right are more often used to reply to other domains,
while domains on the left are more often the recipients of replies.
Figure 7: sT (x) vs. r (x) for October
4 COMPARING TO THE USER LEVEL
Having established a set of results for the structure of invocation
graphs on Twitter, we would like to verify that our findings are
qualitatively consistent with what we see in more traditional user-
to-user communication graphs on social media. Since our Twitter
dataset doesn’t contain information about individual users, we
instead turn to a publicly available Reddit dataset1. Reddit is a com-
munity discussion website organized into posts, or “submissions,”
and comments on those submissions. Comments are threaded, so
that a comment is either in reply to a top-level post or to another
comment. The data consists of every post and comment from Red-
dit in 2016, along with its author’s username. Reddit is subdivided
into forums for particular topics called subreddits. We focus on
three subreddits in particular: r/politics, r/hillaryclinton,
and r/The_Donald, which are devoted to politics, Hillary Clinton,
and Donald Trump respectively. All three subreddits were among
the most active subreddits during 2016. Note that in addition to
studying user-to-user dynamics on Reddit, in principle we could
also use Reddit data to replicate our Twitter invocation-graph anal-
ysis at the domain level; however, it turns out that Reddit contains
too few comments with URLs for robust domain-level trends to
emerge.
Interactions at the User Level. In order to test for analogous
trends at the user level to those we found at the domain level, we
need to modify our methods. In particular, we now need some
kind of political information about users. Whereas in Section 2 we
anchored the political spectrum to the official Clinton and Trump
Twitter accounts, here we anchor our notion of political affiliations
to r/hillaryclinton and r/The_Donald. Since most users are
active in at most one of the two subreddits, we have a simpler
notion of a political score: we define a setUC of users who posted in
r/hillaryclinton but not r/The_Donald, and we define a setUT
of users who posted in r/The_Donald but not r/hillaryclinton.
There are 22,164 users in UC and 281,334 users in UT (more than
1https://files.pushshift.io/reddit/
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Twitter Reddit
1 donaldjtrump.com thegatewaypundit.com
2 thegatewaypundit.com zerohedge.com
3 breitbart.com breitbart.com
4 dailycaller.com donaldjtrump.com
5 zerohedge.com dailycaller.com
6 foxnews.com dailymail.co.uk
7 nypost.com foxnews.com
8 dailymail.co.uk nypost.com
9 thehill.com bbc.co.uk
10 politico.com theguardian.com
11 cbsnews.com cbsnews.com
12 nbcnews.com cnn.com
13 cnn.com thehill.com
14 washingtonpost.com nbcnews.com
15 bbc.co.uk huffingtonpost.com
16 theguardian.com washingtonpost.com
17 nytimes.com nytimes.com
18 huffingtonpost.com politico.com
19 politifact.com newsweek.com
20 newsweek.com politifact.com
21 hillaryclinton.com hillaryclinton.com
Table 1: Comparison of Twitter and Reddit political spectra
ten times the size ofUC ). We assume that most users inUC are pro-
Clinton, while most users inUT are pro-Trump (this is consistent
with the explicit ground rules for participating in these subreddits).
Validating Political Information from Subreddits. We ver-
ify that r/hillaryclinton and r/The_Donald contain strong sig-
nal about political orientation by adapting our methodology from
Twitter to build a spectrum over the domains on Reddit, and then
comparing this spectrum to the one built from Twitter. To do this,
we define PR (x |C) to be the empirical probability that a post or
comment in r/hillaryclinton contains a URL from domain x
(and analogously for PR (x |T ) and r/The_Donald). As in (1), we can
define a political score from Reddit as
sR (x) = PR (x |T )
PR (x |C) + PR (x |T ) . (3)
Table 1 shows the orderings of the Twitter and Reddit spectra
for 21 domains. The Spearman rank correlation [28] (a measure of
squared distance) between the two orderings is 0.871 (compared
to a maximum of 0.757 over 10, 000 randomly shuffled orderings).
Thus the two settings align well, demonstrating that our notion
of political affiliation is adaptable to Reddit, and that it contains
strong and consistent signal.
Building a User-to-User Graph on Reddit. With this notion
of political affiliation, we can now investigate some basic prop-
erties of political discourse on Reddit. Just as we first restricted
our attention to political domains on Twitter, here we restrict our
attention to the main political subreddit r/politics. Since only a
subset of the users in r/politics are in eitherUC orUT , we focus
on comment-reply pairs in which both users involved are in one
of UC or UT . There are 4 possible types of interaction: UC → UC ,
UC → UT , UT → UC , and UT → UT where p → q means that a
user from p posts a reply to a comment from a user in q. Let np→q
be the number of p → q interactions in a given time period. We
organize the data into sliding windows of 30 days. In the following
plots, the value at a particular date represents the 30-day window
ending at that date. Figure 8a shows comment counts throughout
2016 averaged over the next 30 days, and Figure 8b shows what
fraction of the comments were each type of interaction.
Figure 8b shows that a steadily rising number of comments are
cross-cutting (e.g., are of typesUC → UT andUT → UC ) from the
beginning of 2016 up until the election in early November, followed
by a return to a baseline rate. Figure 8c further reinforces this point,
showing a strong negative slope in the ratio of edges between
users of the same political leaning and users of different political
leanings from January until the November 8 election. These results
are consistent with our findings our Twitter, where an increasing
fraction of political interactions reach across the political spectrum
on Twitter up until the election.
To interpret the significance of these results, we adapt our ran-
dom rewiring technique to the user level by randomly reassign-
ing users to comments, preserving the invariant that each user
still posts the same number of comments as in the original data.
Whether we randomize globally (a comment is randomly attrib-
uted to any user from all of 2016) or each month (a comment is
attributed to a randomly chosen user from the same month that
comment was written), the results are the same – the observed
slope is significantly more negative than the minimum over 100
random trials.
Using our Reddit dataset, we’ve shown that our invocation graph
methodology can be adapted to analyze traditional user-user com-
munication graphs. In particular, we’ve used co-occurrences to
determine political information about both users and domains. The
month-to-month trend found at the user level mirrors our findings
on Twitter — in the months leading up to the election, online polit-
ical interaction increasingly reached across the political spectrum.
5 TWO-DIMENSIONAL ALIGNMENT
Our formulation of the political spectrum in this work indicates
that it has a natural two-dimensional structure, with one dimension
corresponding to co-occurrence probabilities with content related
to one candidate, and the other dimension corresponding to co-
occurrence probabilities with content related to the other candidate.
In Section 4, when we established that our invocation graph
methodology extends naturally to the traditional user-level set-
ting, part of our analysis involved measuring how well the one-
dimensional spectra sT (·) and sR (·) shown in Table 1 align. Here
we consider how to measure the alignment of the corresponding
two-dimensional spectra.
To make this comparison, we need to account for the fact that
axes may have different scales (e.g. posts on Reddit contain URLs
at a different rate than on Twitter). This means we need to scale
PR (x |C) and PR (x |T ) in order to find the “best match” between
the two spectra. We formalize this as the following optimization
problem, minimizing the squared ℓ2 distance of each pair of points:
min
a,b :a,b≥0
∑
x ∈D
(PT (x |C) − aPR (x |C))2 + (PT (x |T ) −bPR (x |T ))2 (4)
where D is the set of domains. Since all points lie in the first quad-
rant, we can drop the constraint a,b ≥ 0. Note that (4) can be
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(a) Comment counts (b) Interaction types (c) Ratio of replies across the political spectrum
Figure 8: User-level trends from the Reddit dataset. In Figure 8c, a decrease in (nC→C + nT→T )/(nC→T + nT→C ) shows more
interaction reaching across the spectrum.
separated into 2 identical optimization problems of the form
min
c
∑
x ∈D
(ux − cvx )2. (5)
If u and v are the vectors [ux : x ∈ D]⊤ and [vx : x ∈ D]⊤
respectively, then this can be written asminc
∑
x ∈D ∥u−cv ∥22 . This
is convex and has derivative
d
dc
∥u − cv ∥22 =
d
dc
(u − cv)⊤(u − cv) = 2v⊤u − 2cv⊤v .
Setting this equal to 0, we find that (5) has the solution c = v⊤uv⊤v .
Using this, we can scale the Reddit spectrum to compare it to
the Twitter spectrum, producing the plot shown in Figure 9. The
spectra roughly align, with the domains in approximately the same
positions for both Twitter and Reddit.
Figure 9: Scaled spectrum comparison
If instead we wish to minimize ℓ1 distance between pairs of
points, we get the optimization problem
min
a,b :a,b≥0
∑
x ∈D
|PT (x |C) − aPR (x |C)| + |PT (x |T ) − bPR (x |T )| (6)
Again, this results in two separate optimizations of the form
min
c
∑
x ∈D
|ux − cvx |. (7)
The subgradient of each term is{
{vx · sign(cvx − ux )} ux , cvx
[−vx ,vx ] otherwise
We sort the x ’s by increasing ux /vx , so i < j =⇒ uxi /vxi ≤
ux j /vx j , and then choose i such that∑
j≤i
vx j >
∑
j>i
vx j and
∑
j<i
vx j <
∑
j≥i
vx j .
Essentially, i balances the vx j ’s, splitting them into two sets such
that addingvxi to either set gives that set the larger sum of the two.
Thus, the subgradient of (7) contains 0 for c = uxivxi , making this the
solution to (6).
We can also use this same alignment technique to compare spec-
tra between months. Figures 10a and 10b show that in absolute
terms, the spectra produced by January and February on Twitter
look quite different. In fact, after scaling the axes, the spectra align
very well (Figure 10c, using ℓ1-minimization). One way to see this
is to compare the quality of alignment in our data the quality of
alignment among shuffled versions of the spectra for January and
February, where the domains labeling the points are randomly per-
muted; we find that the alignment for the real data has much lower
cost than the typical alignment for shuffled data. The disparity
between the unscaled spectra seems to indicate an influx of users
in February who retweeted Clinton but didn’t necessarily engage
in other sorts of political activity; this left the relative position of
other domains in the two-dimensional spectrum unaffected.
We also note this type of scaling doesn’t affect the one-dimensional
orderings in Table 1. We can rewrite the political score as sT (x) =
1
1+tan θT , where θT is the angle of x from the PT (x |C) axis. Since
scaling the axes preserves the ordering of these angles, it also pre-
serves the one-dimensional rankings.
6 FURTHER RELATEDWORK
Our work builds on rich literatures in online social media, online
news, information diffusion, and the landscape of online political
interaction, and it also draws on a long history of work studying
the role of media in politics.
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(a) January 2016 (b) February 2016 (c) Scaled Comparison
Figure 10: Spectrum Comparison for January and February 2016 on Twitter
With access to information now abundant, a growing line of
work has investigated how this impacts consumption of political
information. As mentioned in the introduction, a key issue has been
measuring the extent to which online political interaction crosses
ideological divides, or whether it stays relatively confined in “filter
bubbles” or “echo chambers” [3, 11, 13, 15, 27, 31]. Concerns about
the Web potentially catalyzing balkanization, or fragmentation into
isolated ideological divisions, date from the 1990s [32]. Early em-
pirical work on the structure of online political interaction through
blogging identified strong ideological partitions evident in large-
scale analysis of linking patterns [1], whereas analyses of more
recent social media platforms finds evidence for a more complex
structure, in which both ideological entrenchment and exposure to
more diverse content is promoted on the Web [3, 11].
More broadly, our paper relates to the extensive work on the
structure of information sharing on the Web [4], as well as theoreti-
cal work on how network structure affects information flow [18, 20].
This structure has been quantified in many ways, particularly by or-
ganizing shares into information cascades [8, 17], where nodes are
typically people and edges between people indicate if one person
directly shared a piece of content with another person. In contrast,
our work here introduces and studies invocation graphs, where
nodes are information sources and edges indicate that a user shared
content from one source in response to content from another source.
The role of the media in politics is the subject of an active field
of study [19, 29]. Particularly relevant to our work here is the study
of how news and public opinion spread through social networks,
including the early theory of two-step flow [21]. More recently,
there has been a spirited debate about the impact that “influencers”
have on these processes [2, 7, 16, 22, 33].
7 CONCLUSION
In this work we have introduced invocation graphs, together with
a set of techniques for analyzing them, as a means of probing
the structure of online political interaction. In combination with
previous methods for inducing a political spectrum from data, we
develop methods for measuring several important phenomena. In
particular, we analyzed a natural embedding of the invocation graph
in the political spectrum, and asked how its edges are distributed
across this spectrum—whether they are sequestered in ideological
pockets or whether they span larger ideological distances. Applying
these techniques to political interaction on Twitter in the months
leading up to the 2016 US Presidential election, we observed that
political interaction via the invocation graph became increasingly
cross-cutting as the election neared. We also developed methods
to analyze whether there are inherent asymmetries between how
the right and the left engage each other via replies. Applying our
techniques to Twitter, we found that edges in in the invocation
graph more consistently went from sources on the right to sources
on the left than in the other direction.
It is worth emphasizing a critical feature of invocation graphs,
which is that they are composed of invoked interactions as opposed
to direct interactions. Although on a surface level invocation graphs
may resemble the hyperlink graphs that form a basic staple of Web
analysis, they are actually quite different, as the links are generally
not under the nodes’ control. News sources publish content, and
then it is up to the readership to determine how these sources
connect to each other in the invocation graph. In this sense, relative
positions and functions of news domains in invocation graphs are
indicative of how the public actually uses them in online political
discussion. Beyond the ideological territory news sources may try
to explicitly claim for themselves, invocation graphs position these
sources according to their roles in political interaction.
There are a number of important directions that remain to be
pursued. First, it is intriguing to see how interaction both in the
invocation graph on Twitter and the user-to-user interaction graph
on Reddit became more and more ideologically cross-cutting as
the election approached, given that homophily would suggest that
most links should link to nearby points on the spectrum. Is there a
systematic way to relate this trend to an underlying level of polar-
ization, so that changes in the structure of the embedded invocation
graph might provide insight into polarization and how it evolves?
Second, beyond the two large social media datasets we considered,
it would be illuminating to apply our methods in other settings as
well. In particular, does online debate increasingly cross ideological
divides in the run-up to milestone events in general, or was this
specific to the 2016 US Presidential election? In general, we believe
that applying and extending our methods for online political inter-
action using invocation graphs contains many promising directions
for future work.
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